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ALLOCATION OF REORGANIZATION EXPENSES
SEYMOUR J. RUBIN t
"Ah, take the Cash and let the Credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of a distant drum."
THE progress of a reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act carries with it some attendant expenses. Trustees and their counsel,
creditors and their counsel, accountants, and the like, as well as referees,
all are often necessarily employed during the course of the reorganiza-
tion. Whether the reorganization fails, and the petition is dismissed,
or straight bankruptcy is resorted to, or the reorganization is successful
in the sense that a plan is approved and adopted, fees and expenses
accrue. The problem may then arise whether or not secured creditors
may be compelled to pay a share of these expenses.
LIQUIDATION OR DIsMISSAL
For any one of several reasons, a petition for reorganization which
has been approved by the court may be dismissed. In the decree of
dismissal the court may or may not order liquidation under the orthodox
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. If dismissal alone is ordered, the
fee question will generally be immediately raised. If liquidation is
ordered, decision may be postponed. In either situation, it is important
to decide (1) the amount of fees to which participants in the abortive
reorganization are entitled, and (2) which claimants - secured credi-
tors, unsecured creditors, or stockholders - are to bear the cost of the
attempt at reorganization.
Whether fees may be charged to pledged assets may determine whether
participants in an abortive reorganization do or do not receive com-
pensation. In the Centralia Refining Company case,1 for example,
the debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter X. The court ap-
proved the petition, appointed a temporary trustee (later made per-
manent), and authorized him to engage an auditor and counsel as aides.
Under a later court order the trustee employed watchmen for the prop-
erty and made the necessary expenditures for maintenance, including
insurance. No question was raised as to the necessity for all these
expenditures or the value of the services rendered.
t Attorney, Office of Price Administration; formerly Attorney, Reorganization Divi-
sion, Securities and Exchange Commission.
Nothing herein should be construed as expressing the opinion of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or any member of its staff.
1. 35 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. Ill. 1940), (1941) 54 HARv. L. 1REv. 1228. Cf. In re
Gage County Electric Co., C. C. H. 1940 Bankr. Serv. II 52,602 (D. Neb. 1940),
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It shortly became apparent, however, that no plan of reorganization
was feasible. The court adjudged the debtor a bankrupt and directed
liquidation under Section 238 of the Bankruptcy Act.' At a later date
in the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee applied for a court order
authorizing sale of certain of the debtor's liened property free and clear
of the liens. Since other assets were not sufficient, the trustee sought
to charge the liened property with all costs of administration for the
entire period since the filing of the Chapter X petition. The court
referred the matter to a referee, who found that the property of the
bankrupt was worth $12,000, that the liens covering the same property
amounted to $18,000, and, as a conclusion of law, that the property
was chargeable with the necessary costs of preserving it- insurance,
watchmen, light and power- but not with the general costs of admin-
istration- court costs, trustee's and counsel's fees, and expenses. The
court affirmed the referee's decision, holding that lien creditors in an
unsuccessful reorganization could be charged only with the necessary
costs of preserving the property3 plus those costs which they had caused,
which were incurred for their benefit, or to wlhich they had consented.'
Contrary to the Centralia case, the District Court for the District of
Nebraska in the Gage Electric Company case3 asserted power to charge
pledged assets with all the costs of an abortive reorganization, including
fees awarded to court-appointed officials. Reading together Sections 241
to 246, the court came to the conclusion that compensation might be
allowed from pledged assets :' . . . Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act
provides for allowances by the court for certain services, including those
of a trustee in a proceeding of this nature, and does not provide that
the payment of such claims shall be made from property other than
mortgaged property. Such allowances are to be paid on the same basis
as the costs and fees of the officers of the bankruptcy court are paid."
2. 52 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 638(1) (Supp. 1939).
3. Costs of preservation are always given priority over claims of sccurcd as Vell
as unsecured creditors for obvious reasons. Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Ry. v.
Wilson, 138 U. S. 501 (1S91) ; Robinson v. Dickey, 36 F. (2d) 147 (C. . A. 3d, 1929) ;
cf. Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533 (1903); MacGregor v. Johnson-Cowdin-Emnier-
ich, 31 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
4. Just how it is to be determined that a numerous group of bondholders hae
"consented to" the proceedings is a difficult question. The actions of a committee on their
behalf might be opposed by a minority, and other complexities might result. cf. In re
Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (AN. D. Ky. 1936). It seems sometimes to be
implied that benefit and consent must both be present in order that the lienholder may
be charged. See Robinson v. Dickey, 36 F. (2d) 147, 149 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) ; Tavney
v. Clemson, 81 F. (2d) 300, 304 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). Cf. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers
Milk Products Co., 21 F. (2d) 414, 417 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
5. C. C. H. 1940 Bankr. Serv. 152,602 (D. Neb. 1940).
6. The Centralia case does not cite the Gage Conty case.
7. In re Gage County, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1940 52,Q2 (D. Neb. 194u). An
important limitation on fees allowable under the Gage Counly case is the reading of
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Costs and fees in straight bankruptcy, however, are paid from free
assets and not from mortgaged or pledged assets. Liens have priority
over all expenses of administration other than costs of preservation of
the property (or costs which are caused or consented to by the lien-
holders).' The Centralia case transposes the orthodox bankruptcy rule
into reorganization; the Gage County case, on the other hand, considers
all assets in a Chapter X proceeding (which affects the rights of all
creditors, secured and unsecured) to be analogous to free assets in
straight bankruptcy (which affects only the rights of unsecured credi-
tors). The thesis of this article, that the Gage County view is prefer-
able, can perhaps be best explained by tracing what seem to be tile
antecedents of the Centralia decision.
The question of applying straight bankruptcy fee standards to reor-
ganizations first arose in cases under Section 77B involving the issue
of amount of compensation - not priority of that amount. These cases
generally held that the straight bankruptcy rule as to amount of coin-
pensation allowable applied if liquidation followed proceedings tinder
Section 77B.' The reasoning of a typical case was this :10 Section 77B
(c) (8) provided that the judge might direct liquidation if a plan of
reorganization were not proposed or accepted. Section 77B (k) (5) stated
that if liquidation were directed "debts shall be entitled to priority as
provided in Section 64." The court held that Section 77B(k) (5) was
mandatory and that compensation was to be allowed as if all of the
proceedings had been in straight bankruptcy, rather than on the more
generous scale permitted by Section 77B(c) (9).11
These cases did not, however, settle whether the amount allowed in
an unsuccessful Section 77B proceeding could be paid out of mortgaged
Sections 241 to 246 to apply in the dismissal situation as well as where the reorganization
is successful. Since no plan is ordinarily approved where dismissal is ordered, attorneys
for creditors must prove that their services were in connection with the administration
of the estate-a rather narrow concept-in order to prove their right to fees.
8. Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Ry. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501 (1891); In re
Ivel Displays, 74 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Title and Trust Co. v. Wernich,
68 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
9. Callaghan v. RFC, 297 U. S. 464 (1936); Sartorius v. Bardo, 95 F. (2d) 387
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; In re Higgin Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 120 (E. D. Ky. 1937) ; In re
Manhattan Music Hall, 14 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); see It re Old Algiers, Inc.,
100 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (W.
D. Ky. 1936). But cf. Oakland Hotel Co. v. Crocker First Nat. Bank, 85 F. (2d) 959
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936); cf. Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 262, 271.
10. In re Manhattan Music Hall, 14 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
11. Section 77B(c) (9) permits the court to "allow a reasonable compensation for
the services rendered and reimbursement for the actual and necessary expenses incurred
in connection with the plan by officers, parties in interest, depositaries, reorganization
managers, and committees or other representatives of creditors or stockholders, and the
attorneys or agents of any of the foregoing."
(Vol, 5I1: 418
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as well as free assets. In the Louisville Storage Conipany case 2 the
court stated, as dictum,' that the straight bankruptcy rule of priority
applied, so that fee claimants might be paid only if free assets were
available. But the secured creditor had requested the appointment of
receivers; the court therefore held it had "caused" the receiver's and
related fees, so that these fees might be paid from mortgaged assets.
Miners Savings Bank of Pittston Z,. Joyce'4 was a direct holding to
the same effect as the Louisville dictum. The court ruled that reor-
ganization benefited equity interests (and perhaps unsecured creditors)
but not secured creditors:
"XVhere, as here, the business of the debtor was carried on prior
to the sale in the hope of reorganization the lienholder's forbearance
in not foreclosing its lien, which enabled the business to Ise thus
carried on in the mortgaged property, was obviously fi ,r the benefit
of the debtor and its general creditors. The fact that the mort-
gagee did not press for foreclosure but consented to permit the
business to be carried on in the mortgaged property should not
be held to penalize it by postponing its lien to the expenses of
operating the business, since to so hold would be to place a penalty
upon a lien creditor for its forbearance and for the consideration
which it has shown for general creditors. 15 This of course is not
to say that the lienholder should not bear the reasonable expenses
of preserving the property, which expenses were clearly for its
benefit."
16
The reasoning of the Miners and Louisvifle cases may be questioned.
Inasmuch as an involuntary petition often embarrasses stockholders
more than it does secured creditors, the general theory of the benevolence
of secured creditors expressed in the Miners case may be inaccurate.
However that may be, the terms of Chapter X afford ample reason for
abandoning the result of the cases decided under Section 77B.
It is clear that the Section 77B rule as to amount of fees in a dismissed
reorganization has been changed by Section 246.17 The Centralia case,
12. 21 F. Supp. 897 (V. D. Ky. 1936).
13. In the traditional, non-Llewellynian sense.
14. 97 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
15. Compare the statement of judge Learned Hand, in Sartorius v. Pardo, 95 F.
(2d) 3S7, 389 (C. C. A. 2d, 193S), that the conclusion that compensation culd nut b.
granted "follows from the nature of the proceeding and from the theory uf it which
coerces recalcitrant creditors only upon conditions which by hypothesis are nut ful-
filled."
16. 97 F. (2d) 973, 977 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
17. In re Old Algiers, 100 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Section 246 dircct-s
that upon dismissal or entry of an order adjudicating the debtor a bankrult "the judge
may allow reasonable compensation for services rendered .. . in such proceeding prior
to such dismissal or order of adjudication . . .and shall mnake provision for the pay-
ment thereof . . ."
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however, holds that even though amount is determined under the pro-
visions of Chapter X, ability to charge liened assets for those fees is
still to be decided by reference to the provisions of straight bankruptcy.
For several reasons, this conclusion seems dubious. Section 246 not
only establishes a new scale of wages for counsel in an unsuccessful
reorganization, but states that the court "shall make provision for the
payment thereof .. ."1 Where a debtor owns only mortgaged assets,
any provision for payment of the fees made by the court would collide
with the rule that lien creditors may not be charged for such adminis-
tration expenses. 9 In addition to this mandatory direction that the court
make provision for payment, there is evidence contradicting the Centralia
holding in the legislative history of Section 246. An extract from the
report of the National Bankruptcy Conference to the House Committee
on the Judiciary, dealing with an amendment to Section 77B (c) (9),
the substance of which was adopted as Section 246, is informative:
"We have built up the provisions to make it clear that allowances
may be made for services rendered or'disbursements incurred in a
proceeding under this subsection, even though the plan may not be
confirmed, but a liquidation directed or the proceeding dismissed.
Such compensation and reimbursement should not of course be
made to depend upon the contingency of a confirmation. If it is to
be expected that responsible parties are to render effective service
in a reorganization proceeding, provision must be made for reason-
able compensation to them, regardless of the outcome of the pro-
ceedings. To do otherwise may invite into the proceedings less effi-
cient and reslionsible persons."1
2 0
18. Italics supplied.
19. It has been suggested that the result of the Centralia case might be rested on the
ground that the order awarding priority over secured creditors must be made at the
time when reorganization was terminated, and that no jurisdiction to make such an
order existed thereafter. (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 1228, 1229. Cf. In re James Butler
Grocery Co., 100 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; but cf. In re White, 58 F. (2d) 203
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Such a rule is somewhat technical; and it has been held that the
bankruptcy court which succeeds the reorganization court may thereafter grant parity
of treatment to expenses of the reorganization land of the bankruptcy. In re Columbia
Ribbon Co., 117 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). Cf. Missouri v. Earhart, 111 F. (2d)
992 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940). Furthermore, the Cenlralia case clearly assumes the power
of the bankruptcy court to allow fees on the standard of Section 246, but merely denies
power to charge secured creditors for those fees. The court may disiniss the proceed-
ings and thus release the property. The power to provide for payment of the reorgani-
zation expenses at dismissal is the same as the power to provide for those expenses at
entry of an order adjudging the debtor a bankrupt. Cf. In rc Frank Realty Co., 31 F.
Supp. 816 (M. D. Pa. 1940). Cf. Miners Savings Bank of Pittston v. Joyce, 97 F. (2d)
973 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938). If the Centralia case can be whittled down to a narrow "hold-
ing" on a technical procedural point, the decision loses much of its importance and its
interest. The problem of proper construction of Section 246, however, would still remain.
20. ANALYSIS BY NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE OF H. R. 12889, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936), c. 3, §12(1I)(d)(7).
[Vol. 51 : 418
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The Bankruptcy Conference report leaves little doubt that Section 246
was passed to correct the rule of the Manhattan M11usic Hall case."  But
it may be argued that the Conference did not intend to change the rule
that exTpenses were not to be charged to secured creditors. Such an
argument has several parts. The terms of Section 238 2 may be relied
on, since they provide that the proceedings are to be patterned, as near
as may be, after straight bankruptcy; economy is aided by the rule of
the Centralia case; and precedent may to some extent be relied upon.
But a reading of Sections 238 and 246 together certainly makes the
meaning of Section 238 somewhat ambiguous ;" and the scales of statu-
tory construction, on language alone, would seem in favor of the more
generous rule. Economy is curiously achieved if obtained by denying all
compensation to officers appointed by the court, who under the Centralia
rule are forced to gamble on such unpredictable events as creditor ac-
ceptance of a plan.24 It is to be noted that a rule which denied adequate
compensation to committees and their counsel was thought to be rectified
by Section 246. It would seem to follow a fortiori that denial of com-
pensation to trustees and other court-appointed officials should nt
occur.
25
Furthermore, the argument that undue hardship results to fee appli-
cants who are forced to gamble all compensation on the outcome of
the proceeding is not entirely answered by the statement of Judge Caffey
in the Manlttan Music Hall case that "it is common practice in general
litigation, as well as in bankruptcy litigation, for creditors . . . to do
much, and much which enhances the estate involved, and yet bear their
21. 14 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
22. Upon entry of an order directing that bankruptcy be prceeded with, "the pro-
ceeding shall thereafter be conducted so far as possible, in the same manner and with
like effect as if an involuntary petition for adjudication had been filed at the time w:hen
the petition under this chapter was filed . . ."
23. Nor is the matter clarified by the Senate judiciary Committee report, which
states that the section "provides that where a reorganizativn pr cceding supvr~cdc a
bankruptcy proceeding, and the former is then dismissed and bankruptcy proceeded with,
allowances in the bankruptcy proceeding are to be governed by the rules applicable to
such type of proceeding." SEN. Doc. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (193s) 3S.
24. Cordpare, however, In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940), in which the court apparently made the propriety of a payment of a tax and the
consequent liability to surcharge of the trustee depend upon v hether reorganization was
or was not effected. That this puts a burden of prescience upon the trustee was some-
what feebly contested. It may be, however, that the court meant to declare that the pos-
sibility of successful reorganization was so remote that the particular payment was
unreasonably made.
25. It may be possible, where there are some free assets available for fes but nt
enough for trustees and other officials and committees, indenture trustees, etc., to remit
the latter group to their clients, leaving the entire fund for the appointed officials. Cf.
In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
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own expenses."' 26 The analogy to contingent fees is strained when the
fee-applicants are court-appointed trustees, receivers or the like, or when
one of the applicants denied fees because of the immunity of mortgaged
assets is an auditor or member of another profession where fees are not
so commonly risked upon a decision as they are among the brethren
of the coif.
Precedent is hardly conclusive. In the Old Algiers case, the court
held that amount of compensation is to be determined under Section 246
despite entry of an order under Section 238. The National Bankruptcy
Conference explanation of Section 246 seems to make inconsistent a
construction of the statute which is generous as to computation of amount
but leads to complete denial of that amount. The assumption of the
Bankruptcy Conference report, that it is necessary to guarantee payment
without regard to the fortuitous circumstance of confirmation in order
to secure responsible and efficient service, may perhaps be more doubtful
than the Conference thought. But given that assumption as the basis
for Section 246, it would seem difficult to justify the construction adopted
in the Centralia case.
Implicit in the Centralia decision is the conclusion that fees may le
paid from free assets. This is to place the entire burden of the provision
in Section 246 upon unsecured creditors. The competence of the trustee
and his counsel redounds to the possible benefit of all classes of credi-
tors.28 The failure of reorganization may mean that the efforts on behalf
of these classes have failed. But no reason appears why only unsecured
creditors - who may not have instituted the proceedings, who may have
demanded immediate liquidation, who may all along have protested the
proceedings - should be made to pay the costs.
CONSUMMATION OF A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
The problem of allocating fees and reorganization expenses is perhaps
more important and certainly less observed where a plan is finally adopted
and the proceedings are "successful" than in an abortive proceeding. In
the usual case, a plan is worked out and accepted, a new corporation is
26. 14 F. Supp. 48, 55 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
27. In re Old Algiers, 100 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
It should be borne in mind that the requirement of good faith cuts across this
entire field, so that proceedings uselessly prolonged may end with a denial of compcn-
sation. Thus, it may be relevant that a voluntary petition is filed at a time when fore-
closure proceedings are pending, and when reorganization is obviously impracticable. If
the obvious purpose of the petition is to obstruct the secured creditors in the realization
on their security, it would be unjust to compel them to finance the obstruction. But this
principle will bar compensation in few cases; and it would seem to have been inapplica-
ble to the Centralia case.
28. Compare Tawney v. Clemson, 81 F. (2d) 300 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
[Vol. 51:- 418
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set up and the debtor's assets are transferred to it -all before fees are
requested. This method of deferring consideration of the fee problem
has certain implications which may best be explored by means of a
hypothetical illustration.
The Jones-Smith Manufacturing Company owns a plant which is
valued, for reorganization purposes, at $1,000,000. It also has inventory
and cash amounting to a total of $200,000, which is not pledged under
the lien of the mortgage. On the other side of the balance sheet are
an outstanding bond issue of $1,500,000, secured by the plant, and tin-
secured debts of $500,000. The management has filed a voluntary peti-
tion. The company has previously been badly run, and a large burden
has been thrown on the trustee, who, with his counsel, has worked
strenuously to recover lost values, to prosecute neglected claims, and to
draft a sound preliminary plan of reorganization. It may be estimated
that the fees of the trustee and his counsel will come to $200,000 (an
amount which we make large for illustrative purposes). It is called to
the attention of counsel for the trustee that a problem of fee allocation
exists. What effect should this problem have on counsel's drafting of
a plan?
First, a problem not related to apportionment arises: what amount of
securities should be issued? If anticipated fees of $200,000 are deducted
before transfer of the assets to the new corporation, the new corporation
should have a total capitalization of only $1,000,000.1 The tendency,
however, is probably to ignore the fees matter in deciding the amount
of securities to be issued. In most cases, the fees will take a small enough
part of the total assets so that the capitalization- which is necessarily
not mathematically precise in any case - is not thrown far off.
Secondly, the problem of allocating fees and expenses allows the
trustee's counsel to choose among several possible courses of action: he
may allocate or not; and he may settle the problem prior to the issuance
of the securities of the reorganized corporation, or later. Any combina-
tions of these alternatives would seem to lead to a necessary determination
of the allocation issue.
A determhtion, prior to issuance of securities, that there should be
no allocation. If counsel comes to this conclusion, it seems clear that
there exists no equity for the unsecured creditors. Free assets are to
bear, so far as they are able, the costs of reorganization. The estimated
costs exhaust the free assets. Therefore, no securities should be issued
to the unsecured creditors.
A determination, prior to issuance of securities, that there should be
an allocation. In this event, counsel will draft a plan which gives some
29. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 30 U. S. 1IN (1939); cf. Dodd, The
Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1940) 53 H,%V,.
L. Rzv. 713.
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
participation in the reorganized corporation to the unsecured creditors."
Since not all of the estimated expenses of $200,000 are to be paid from
the free assets, some participation must be given to the unsecured claim-
ants. The amount of this participation, however, depends largely upon
the formula used in determining the allocation of the expenses. If
expenses are allocated in the ratio which one set of assets bears to the
other, secured creditors, having the largest amount of assets, will bear
the bulk of the reorganization expenses, and unsecured creditors may
expect a substantial participation in the new corporation. If, on the
other hand, unsecured creditors are required to bear the bulk of expenses
because they are the marginal group benefiting most from the reorgan-
ization, their participation in the new corporation would be cut down.
A determination that the question of allocation need not be settled
until after securities are distributed under the plan. It is clear that, in
this event, counsel has not succeeded in avoiding the problemY' No
doubt, it would seem at first glance that counsel has decided that there
should be no allocation. This appears to be so, since distribution of
securities is to be based upon proportions existing before allocation,82
and there will be no opportunity to do otherwise than have fees paid by
the corporation after securities are distributed. But this apparent decision
may often be illusory. Whether allocation does or does not take place
will depend upon the plan proposed. To illustrate: if the secured credi-
tors are given new bonds, and the unsecured creditors are given common
stock, payments by the new corporation of the reorganization expenses
from current assets, or cash, would in reality be payment by the unse-
cured creditors in their new capacity as common stockholders. On the
other hand, if under the plan some common stock is issued to the old
bondholders, to the extent that that common stock is diminished in value
or in expectation of dividends by the payment of the reorganization
expenses, the old bondholders bear a share of those expenses. Further-
more, if an all common stock plan is adopted, and if distribution of the
stock is made on the basis of the assets available to the secured and the
unsecured creditors prior to deduction of expenses, then the reorganiza-
30. Who, of course, would include the secured creditors to the extent of their defi-
ciency.
31. Similarly, the problem is not avoided if the trustee does not have sufficient cash
to operate the business and raises these funds by issuing certificates secured by the
property. These certificates may rank ahead of the bonds. In re Prima Co., 88 F. (2d)
785 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 736; see Comment (1937) 47 YAL, L, J,
262, 271. If funds raised by issuance of these certificates are used to pay reorgani-
zation expenses, the source from which the certificates are paid at maturity will of
course determine on what class of assets and what class of creditors the expenses have
fallen.
32. Whether or not the total amount of securities to be issued is decreased by the
estimated amount of expenses.
[Vol. 51 : 418
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tion expenses are actually divided between secured and unsecured credi-
tors in the ratio that liened assets bear to free assets.
THE DESIRABILITY OF APPORTIONMENT
It seems evident that the problem of apportionment is inescapable and
that the answer is not so clear. Fees in a successful reorganization may
be charged to pledged assets, as in the fairly common case in which all
of the property is under mortgage and no equity exists for anyone
other than the secured creditors.'N Whether, in the situation in which
there are both free and liened assets, fees should be apportioned, is a
different matter.
It may be argued that free assets should bear, so far as is possible,
the reorganization expenses for a number of reasons. First, since this
is the rule in straight bankruptcy, why not in reorganization? Secondly,
a reorganization benefits the marginal, unsecured creditors far more than
it does the secured creditors. And insofar as the reorganization, by post-
poning the right of the secured creditors to liquidate, creates an equity
for the unsecured creditors, the latter should, it is argued, bear the costs
of the proceeding. Finally, an apportionment rule would be complicated
and difficult, especially since statement of a formula has never been made.
As to the first and second arguments, it should be observed, however,
that since reorganization is a different process from bankruptcy liquida-
tion, different rules are entirely reasonable. It has already been noted
that Section 246 puts into the determination of fees in a reorganization
superseded by bankruptcy a standard different from that of straight
bankruptcy. Determination of amount is thus different in the t,,o
branches of the Bankruptcy Act; determination of the payor of expenses
may also vary, though here the statutory direction is far from clear."
'In bankruptcy, the object of the proceedings is to liquidate and to dis-
tribute the assets equitably. The secured creditors have little to gain from
the bankruptcy proceedings. They will be charged, it has been held,"
the amount which it would have cost them to foreclose their lien in
another way. Beyond this, especially if their security is adequate, the
proceedings have little or no relation to their benefit.
Reorganization, on the other hand, tends to benefit secured creditors
as much as or more than unsecured creditors. The going concern value of
33. Compare In re Prima Co., 8 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), where the court
allowed the issuance of receiver's certificates with priority over the secured claims in
order to obtain funds for administration.
34. It will be recognized that this mere statement that "reorganization is differ-
ent" is hardly an answer except to the first argument-that of the "why not" type. The
solution is furthered neither by the question nor its answer.
35. Odendahl v. Pokorny Realty Co., 76 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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the property is preserved. And it is a fact that in any case in which
the value of the security at its liquidation price is less than the amount
of the secured claims, it is the secured rather than the unsecured credi-
tors who benefit from the preservation of going concern value.,, In the
above hypothetical case, the value of the mortgaged property was
$1,000,000, and the amount of secured claims $1,500,000. Unsecured
creditors, in such a case, might benefit as much by immediate distribu-
tion of the free assets as by a lengthy reorganization. Their hope of
gain lies in the possibility that the preservation of the going concern
value of the property will reduce the deficiency claim of the secured credi-
tors against free assets. But this hope of gain is reduced to a shadow
if all of the reorganization expenses are charged to them. Immediate
distribution, before the expenses of reorganization can be incurred, would
seem their best choice. The reorganization, in such a case, is for the
benefit of the secured creditors, or, to put it in terms of things, for the
enhancement of the liened assets rather than of the free assets.
To pay reorganization expenses from free assets before liened assets
are touched is to grant to the secured creditors a priority in assets to
which they have a claim only to the extent of the deficiency, and a
claim which is entitled only to parity with the unsecured creditors. Free
assets would seem to bear the same relation to unsecured creditors as
liened assets to secured creditors. In substance, the free assets are the
security for the unsecured claims. Consequently, the unsecured creditors
should not be compelled to give up their "security" so that the lienholders
may more fully enjoy theirs.
A closely analogous problem was raised and settled in favor of allo-
cation in Tawney v. Clemson.3- In that straight bankruptcy proceeding,
the district court had not charged the entire expenses to the "general
fund" available to unsecured creditors, but had partially allocated:
"The mortgagee also excepted to the account because the referee
charged against the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property
a share of the expenses of the sale and of the commissions of the
referee and trustee in the proportion which the proceeds of the
mortgaged property bore to the proceeds of the property that was
free from the liens. General expenses of administration, such as
amounts due the referee for notices, filing of claims, and amounts
due attorneys for services rendered to the estate, were not pro rated
but were charged against the general fund. The mortgaged property
sold for enough to pay the mortgage debts, but when the pro rata
share of the expenses and commissions was deducted, there was a
36. As is indicated infra, p. 429, the junior secured creditors have received the benefit
of this preservation of value, and so should bear the part of the expeuses allocated to
secured creditors.
37. 81 F. (2d) 300 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
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balance remaining due on the mortgages which was allowed to par-
ticipate in the general estate only as an unsecured debt."O"
The court held the allocation to be authorized, since the expenses
allocated were partially for the benefit of the secured creditors:
-"No equitable consideration . . . excuses a lienor, who seeks
the aid of the bankruptcy court, from paying such part of the costs
of the sale and of the expenses of administration as is attributable
to the sale of the mortgaged property and the distribution of its
proceeds."3 9
The problem in a reorganization is similar. Taw;ny v. Clenson holds
that a secured creditor must pay for that portion of the services which
are for his benefit; in a reorganization under Chapter X, all services are
partially for the benefit of the secured creditor, since the principal object
of the proceedings is generally to preserve his security with a going
concern value, rather than a forced sale value. A railroad reorganiza-
tion, for example, would certainly benefit holders of a divisional mort-
gage as much as holders of the company's debentures.
Since it is the value of the liened property which is preserved in
reorganization, it would seem fair that those having an interest in that
property should pay a part of the cost of the proceedings. As between
claimants to that property, however, the costs should be borne by the
junior claimants. If preservation of going concern value makes possible
inclusion of a second mortgagee who otherwise would be eliminated,
that junior mortgagee rather than the senior mortgagee should bear the
cost. In other words, the allocation is between liened and free assets,
rather than between classes of creditors. The allocation doctrine thus
is placed on a logical basis of payment by those who receive benefit
for benefits received- entirely consistent with the straight bankruptcy
practice.
That complexities occur is obvious. The going concern value of the
property subject to mortgage may include some equity for the debtor,
which would inure to the benefit of the debtor's general, unsecured credi-
tors, who might, on the basis of the above analysis, have the entirety
of the fees apportioned between their interest in the equity in the mort-
gaged property and their claim to the free assets. For example, where
apportionment of part of the expenses is made to liened assets, junior
interests having a claim to those assets would bear the burden of the ap-
portionment: thus, if unsecured creditors had an equity of $200,00U
in the mortgaged property, and there were free assets worth $200,000,
it would obviously be useless to apportion the reorganization expenses
38. 81 F. (2d) 300, 303-04 (C. C.A. 4th, 1936).
39. Id. at 304.
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(of, say, $100,000) between the equity and the free assets. The result
to the unsecured creditors - or to the stockholders - would be the
same in one case as in the other. The obverse of the coin would be the
case where the deficiency claim of the secured creditors was large in
proportion to the claim of the persons with no security for their claims.
In this latter case, it would make little difference whether the free assets
bore all or an apportioned share of the expenses, for the secured credi-
tors, in their capacity as deficiency claimants, would in any case get the
lion's share of what was left of the free assets. This is merely to state
what perhaps is obvious, that if the unsecured creditors have only a small
share in the free assets, apportionment of expenses will not greatly in-
crease that share.
Finally, it cannot be denied that a rule for allocating expenses between
classes of claimants might be complicated and difficult. A tentative for-
mula might be to apportion costs in the ratio that liened and free assets
bear to the total assets; this would seem neither complicated nor difficult
of application.4 If liened assets were $1,000,000, and free assets
were $200,000, costs might be allocated on a 5-1 basis. Costs of
$100,000 would thus be distributed by charging $17,777.77+ to the
free assets, and $82,222.22+ to the liened assets. Such a suggestion
needs further study; but it would seem to bear some sort of reasonable
relation to benefits received.
Whatever the rule by which costs are allocated, it would seem desir-
able to smoke the problem into the open, and to give some consideration
to whether the present fortuitous method of distributing the cost of a
reorganization should continue. It would be unfortunate if the present
practice should go unremarked, or if what seems to be the undesirable
result of the Centralia case should be adopted in a completed reorgan-
ization.
40. Such a formula was used in Tawney v. Clemson, 81 F. (2d) 300 (C. C. A.
4th, 1936).
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